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GIVEN the marginal importance of foreign trade and the services number of Sc
related toit,such as transportation and insurance, and the import prices
absence of financial flows not tied to trade or tourism, the interna- weaknesses
tional financial relations of the Soviet Union do not rank among feedbacks be
the most important aspects of the Soviet economy, the optimal a
a leading can
The extern
Foreign Exchange and the Exchange Rate to prevent fo
rency, trade
The basic difference between the role of the national currency of revealed offi
the USSR in to international payments and the role of foreign
money in countries with convertible currencies is that the ruble is gold producti
strictly an internal currency.' When it comes to foreign trade or recent years
other international payments, it is nothing more than an internal scholars.4
accounting unit. The Soviet ruble is not, and never has been, The exterri
traded on international exchange markets. Fluctuations in the the U.S. do
exchange value of the ruble under the present regime of floating
exchange rates do not reflect the relationship between demand
2Prices of good
'Discussion in Aizenberg [11 of the role of gold in the Soviet monetary system and the by
relationship between the balance of payments and the money supply is typical for the official exchange r
treatment of these issues by Soviet writers. It ranges from the pertinent quotations from Tounst rates cc
Marx and Engels to the assertion that "the strengthening of the ruble in the world arena will Therefore,
Leadtothe gradual displacement of the dollar from the position it still occupies now cm different from thos
1946] in the world market" (p. 124). cOuntries(East Gei
Exportand import prices may be specified in a convertible currency (usually the U.S. exchange rates for
dollar) or in rubles (usually in trade exchanges with other socialist countries). In the latter 3Aizenberg [1],
case, different implicit exchange rates apply to individual transactions which reflect a rate is independent
variety of subsidies and premiums, and also depend on the point of time at which the equate export and
original transaction was entered and, in some cases, the particular export (or import) 4For earlier esti
organization (a ministry or its subordinated or special-purpose organization) involved. Kaser [242] and B
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for, and supply of, various foreign currencies, but are computed
cross rates based on an administratively determined ruble-dollar
rate. The administratively set exchange rates are practically per-
manent in the case of socialist countries. For other countries
changes are made normally only to acknowledge foreign devalua-
tions and revaluations and, since the advent of floating rates,
significant changes in the exchange market.2 Official exchange
rates are neither capable of reflecting a disequilibrium in pay-
ments flows involving a trade partner nor can they be interpreted
as equilibrium rates. They are, indeed, completely irrelevant for
foreign trade as export prices are quoted in a convertible cur-
rency, such as the dollar. Foreign analysts and an increasing
number of Soviet economists consider the isolation of export and
import prices from the domestic price structure as one of the basic
weaknesses of the Soviet economic system. Recognizing that
feedbacks between foreign and domestic prices are essential for
the optimal allocation of resources, they consider foreign trade as
a leading candidate for radical reforms.3
The external value of the ruble rests on strict controls designed
to prevent foreigners from acquiring any negotiable claims (cur-
rency, trade bills, et cetera) denominated in rubles. Nothing is
revealed officially about the size or management of the gold or
foreign exchange reserves of the Soviet Union. The size of its
gold production has long been only a matter of guesswork, but in
recent years detailed estimates have been made by Western
scholars.4
The external parity of the ruble was set originally in terms of
the U.S. dollar and subsequently (in 1961) in terms of gold
2Prices of goods sold domestically for convertible currency by special stores controlled
by Vneshposyltorg suggest the real purchasing power of the dollar is several times the
official exchange rate.
Tourist rates could not be as completely isolated from domestic prices as goods prices.
Therefore, exchange rates available to tourists from socialist countries are set at levels
different from those represented to be official exchange rates. In contrast to other socialist
countries (East Germany being a special case), the Soviet Union does not now have special
exchange rates for tourists from nonsocialist countries.
3Aizenberg [I], for instance, while pointing out that in socialist countries the exchange
rate is independent of the balance of payments, advocates setting it at a level which would
equate export and import prices with world market prices (pp. 102—104 and p. 115).
4For earlier estimates, see Zauberman [256] and Altman [214]. For recent estimates, see
Kaser [242] and Bush [223].136 Banking and the Foreign Sector
(0.987412 grams).5 Official foreign exchange parities, however, March 1973,
have no operational meaning, since the ruble is not convertible reflect the
into the currency of any other country. Rubles that might come markets. For
into the hands of foreigners, or are payable to them (for instance, Soviet Union
royalties), cannot be exchanged for a convertible currency; only
convertible currencies held by tourists and diplomats can be
exchanged at the posted rates.
Two changes in the external value of the ruble in terms of the
U.S. dollar were undertaken between the end of World War II International
and the floating of the U.S. dollar. In March 1950 the rate was essentially to
raised from 5.3 to 4.0 rubles to the dollar in recognition of the Exports ar
decline in the Soviet price level following the currency conversion national prod
of 1947. In 1961 a new parity was established in a manner to decisions ma
create the impression that the external value of the new ruble had PartlY as a r
increased. Actually, however, the ruble was devalued, even Bolshevik s&
though its gold content was set 10 percent above that of the dollar World Wars I
(and, incidentally, above that of the Tsarist ruble). Indeed, the consider forei
one-for-ten rate at which domestic currency was exchanged not, or could
would have required setting the value of the dollar at 40 new of the Soviet
kopeks rather than at 90. The new exchange rate (1 ruble =$1.11) climatologica
was much closer to the special rate introduced in April 1957 for feasible.
"noncommercial" transactions, which applied to tourist expendi- After Won
tures in the USSR and foreign exchange requirements of Soviet western bord
tourists traveling to non-Communist countries' and thus was more creation of
representative of purchasing power parities. While the dual the economie
exchange system was abolished at the time of the 1961 revalua- planning trad
tiOfl,6 which raised the cost of foreign travel and similar expendi- progress has
tures in the Soviet Union by 11 percent, the overall effect of the adoption of
rate unification on the Soviet balance was very small, since export immediately
and import prices continued to be divorced from the domestic COMECON i
priée level, foreign trade.
The two successive changes of the U.S. dollar's parity in terms achieve abet
of gold, in December 1971 and February 1973, resulted in the industrializati
establishment of new exchange rates based on the unchanged gold Union freque
content of the ruble. In fact, since the dollar began to float in national objec
advent of the
5For a review of changes in the official ruble exchange rate between 1917 and 1957, see gap with the
Holzman [240]. For more recent years, this information is readily available. nolicv In rec
6For a review of the history of multiple exchange rates to favor tourism and for non- "
.
merchandisepayments, see [1], p. 105. Union consid
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March 1973, official rates have been established each month to
reflect the changing value of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange
markets. For example, in September 1973, the rate offered in the
Soviet Union was 72 kopeks to the dollar.
Foreign Trade and Payments
International financial relations of the Soviet Union are confined
essentially to those related to trade and tourism.
Exports are equivalent to only about 4 percent of the gross
national product of the Soviet Union. In part as a result of policy
decisions made in the formative years of the Soviet Union, and
partly as a reflection of the economic blockade following the
Bolshevik seizure of power and the political isolation between
World Wars I and II, the basic policy of the country has been to
consider foreign trade as a means of obtaining goods which were
not, or could not be produced domestically. The rich endowment
of the Soviet Union in natural resources and the wide range of
climatological zones within itsterritory made such a policy
feasible.
After World War II, the emergence of socialist states on its
western border, and Communist China to the south, and the
creation of the COMECON offered the challenge of integrating
the economies of the Soviet Union with those of its allies and
planning trade to achieve common development goals. Little
progress has been made so far in this direction, even after the
adoption of the "Complex Program" in 1971. Nevertheless, since
immediately after the war, the Soviet Union's trade with its
COMECON partners has represented about two-thirds of all its
foreign trade. While the exchange of goods is officially planned to
achieve a better coordination of the various socialist countries'
industrialization efforts, de facto, the trade partners of the Soviet
Union frequently pursue policies influenced by much narrower
national objectives. In more recent years, in particular since the
advent of the political "detente," the closing of the technological
gap with the West has become a major objective of economic
policy. In recent years a number of factors have allowed the Soviet
Union considerable flexibility in managing its foreign exchange138 Banking and the Foreign Sector
obligations. These include use of the Eurodollar market, the ability and of all the el
of the Soviet-owned banks abroad to attract deposits from a variety pattern of
of sources, and the temporary availability of foreign exchange allocation ofre
resources of other socialist countries using these banks. consumption
Changes in emphasis in policy objectives have not as yet imported mate
eventuated in a change in the basic structure of international economy of a
payments and the related mechanisms. The international mone- technology, tw
tary relations of the Soviet Union are based on direct and corn- through admini
plete regulation of trade and all foreign payments flows. Complete The foreign 1
control over international payments was established almost from with their cbs
the very beginning of the Soviet regime by introducing a govern- Soviet authorjt
ment foreign exchange monopoly in 1918 and by placing all receipts of con
foreign trade in the hands of state foreign trade organizations. All It may be said
receipts of foreign currency in whatever form are disposed of by oped countries
the government through the State Bank and its agents. supply limitati
The mechanics of the financing of Soviet foreign trade are quite oped countries,
simple.7 In the case of imports from countries with convertible of how much o
currencies, such finance has been easily handled by traditional financed by gol
banking channels used by nonsocialist countries and through Financing fo
bilateral compensating arrangements. The multilateral clearing of flows involve ci
payments among COMECON countries has been ultimately Trade (which a
shifted to a specialized institution.8 The real problem has always try of Finance,
been the attainable volume of trade and not techniques of settling The pattern c
international payments. The main difficulty has been the limited tional factors:
availability of goods which could be sold to various trade partners monopoly of fi
to earn enough convertible exchange in order to achieve import central
targets set in the successive Five-Year Plans. It always has been a compartmentali
problem of central planning, not of the financial or payments about each of t]
mechanism. ments had been
By the same token, the complete isolation of foreign trade from Soviet regime a
domestic production and prices9 has deprived the Soviet Union, tries. It is impo
in every but the purely formal sense, of a link to the world market while basically
means need to
7The author of the first comprehensive monograph on the foreign trade of the socialist been continued
countries, F. Pryor [141] did not find it necessary to discuss financing of this trade. Neither icant change in did many of the studies published subsequently and dealing with the foreign trade of the
Soviet Union or of the socialist countries, smaller socialisi
8For a short review of the history of foreign payments of the Soviet Union, see Polyakov prises to deal di
[1991 and Familton [2301. See also Altschuier [5], Meznerics [133], Wilczynski [156], .
Zwass[159] and Zotschew [158]. ing in not
'On the relationship of foreign to domestic prices, see Chapter 3. by authorizing
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the ability and of au the effects of continuous exposure to the shifting world
,fromavariety pattern of demand and prices. It has also prevented the optimal
eign exchange allocation of resources between exports and output for domestic
,anks. consumption and between alternative uses of domestic and
not as yet imported materials and finished goods. It has deprived the Soviet
t international economy of a continuing stimulus to improve product quality and
iational mone- technology, two areas in which improvements have been sought
rect and corn- through administrative intervention rather than market exposure.
Complete The foreign trade and foreign exchange monopolies, together
d almost from with their close control over all nontrade transactions, permit the
a govern- Soviet authorities to balance foreign obligations against expected
placing all receipts of convertible and other categories of foreign exchange.
anizations. All It may be said that Soviet imports from Socialist and less-devel-
iisposed of by oped countries basically reflect the highest level attainable given.
supply limitations in the Soviet Union, while those from devel-
itrade are quite
I opedcountries, and in particular the U.S., reflect basic decisions
th convertible of how much of a gap between the imports and exports should be
by traditional financed by gold exports or foreign credit.
and through Financing foreign trade and managing international payments
clearing of flows involve close cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign
en ultimately Trade (which administers the foreign trade monopoly), the Minis-
has always try of Finance, the State Bank, and the Bank for Foreign Trade.
lues of settling The pattern of foreign payments is determined by four institu-
en the limited tional factors: the state monopoly of foreign trade, the state
trade partners monopoly of foreign exchange holdings and transactions, the
chieve import central planning and control of the balance of payments, and the
ays has been a compartmentalization of foreign payments. More will be said later
or payments about each of these factors. The first three institutional arrange-
ments had been introduced originally at the very beginning of the
ign trade from Soviet regime and have been copied by the other socialist coun-
Soviet Union, tries. It is important to note, however, that these arrangements,
world market while basically inherent in a centrally directed economy, by no
means need to be maintained in the rigid form in which they have
rade of the socialist been continued in the Soviet Union practically without any signif-
f this trade. Neither icant change in over half a century. In particular, several of the roreign trade of the I . . .
smallersocialist countries now authorize some important enter-
see Polyakov prises to deal directly with foreign customers or suppliers, includ-
ing those in nonsocialist countries. They also encourage exports
by authorizing enterprises to retain a specified proportion of the140 Banking and the Foreign Sector
foreign exchange proceeds of their exports to convertible cur-
rency countries. In the Soviet Union, international monetary
flows are not only centrally controlled and directed, but they
actually pass (with insignificant exceptions) through separate
enterprises created to handle various kinds of transactions and to
act as intermediaries between domestic enterprises and foreign
buyers and sellers. From the point of view of an individual
enterprise, there is no basic difference between domestic and
foreign sales; export levels are based on targets or quotas set by
planningauthoritiesratherthantheenterprise's economic
decisions.
The Soviet payments system is related to planning and corn-
partmentalization of foreign payments. The balance of payments
is planned in advance each year (and projected for longer periods,
such as those covered by the Five-Year Plans), country by coun-
try.'° Trade with the COMECON countries is conducted on a
cash basis multilaterally, at least in theory, and payments are
planned to be compensated in full. Trade with nonsocialist coun-
tries is usually conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements,
which set specific overall volume targets, with the important, but
not single, exception of the U.S. While imports and exports (and
invisibles) may not balance for each country, the total balance
with countries with convertible currencies is settled separately.
Since the ruble is not an international currency, trade between the
USSR and the non-socialist countries is invoiced in dollars, ster-
ling, or some other convertible currency, so that surpluses with
one country can be used to meet deficits with some other
countries.
Skillful management of foreign exchange resources on the basis
of projections, formalized as foreign exchange budgets, together
with a scrupulously punctual discharge of all its obligations"
'°The task of projecting exchange receipts and commitments and the general strategy of
managing foreign trade resources is the responsibility of the State Bank's foreign exchange
planning department. It discharges this task in close cooperation with the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, which has the power to restructure trade exchanges to fit the Soviet Union's
foreign exchange capabilities and to make adjustments for changes in price and availability
of commodities. An annual foreign exchange plan elaborated through the cooperation of the
State Bank, the Gosplan, and the Ministry of Finance is formally approved by the Council of
Ministers; it is, in fact, an ox ante balance of payments. See also Neuberger [135] and
Kaser [2421.
'1The Soviet Union has never defaulted on any of its obligations to creditors in
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enabled the Soviet Union to expand its foreign trade between the
two world wars and to increase it considerably, with socialist as
well as nonsocialist countries, after World War II. The world's
largest gold producer outside South Africa, it has been able to
meet balance of payments deficits arising from extraordinary
circumstances (such as exceptionally poor harvests in 1965) by
drawing on its gold reserves.
The foreign trade relations, and thus the foreign payments
flows, of the Soviet Union have thus developed into three sepa-
rate, though interrelated spheres: socialist countries, industrial
countries with freely convertible currencies, and less developed
countries. At present the difference between arrangements
involving industrially more advanced and less developed coun-
tries lies mostly in the greater survival in the second group of
what in fact amounts to barter agreements stipulating balancing of
trade and restricting the disposal of credit balances.
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
Formal multilateral clearing (mutual offsets) of trade and other
payments was not undertaken until the formation of the Interna-
tional Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC), under the spon-
sorship of COMECON, which began operations at the start of
1964.12 However, the ruble has been a unit of account for settling
intra-bloc trade since 1951, and arrangements for settling bilateral
balances through the State Bank have existed since 1957. As a
matter of fact, even before the creation of IBEC, practically all
payments between the Soviet Union and the other socialist coun-
tries (95 percent in 1960) were made through mutual offsets.
Multilateral balancing, one of the main goals of COMECON, has
made little progress so far. In 1973, less than 4 percent of the trade
was multilaterized. This is partly due to the absence of an interre-
lated price system, limited coordination of national economic
plans, and complexity of the annual negotiations required, and
IBEC charter, as well as the agreement underlying settlements in transferable
rubles, have been published in The American Review of Soviet and Eastern European
Foreign Trade, January—February 1966. For a description of the history of the settlement
arrangement between the Soviet Union and its socialist trading partners, see Gerashchenko
[29]. See also Moscow Narodny Bank [258], Francuz [230] and Gekker [235].142 Banking and the Foreign Sector
"For further details, see Zwass [159]; see also Babitchev, in [118]. For a history of
partly due to the reluctance of individual countries to incur a
deficit with any trading partner.
The International Bank for Economic Cooperation. Cur-
rently, all payments between the Soviet Union and the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe (except Albania and Yugoslavia), as
well as Mongolia, are cleared through the multilateral clearing
arrangements of IBEC. Cuba became a member effective January
1, 1974. While settlements are multilateral, the underlying trade
agreements are bilateral. The intra-bloc trade is conducted, in
effect, as barter trade, on the basis of binding delivery contracts
and negotiated prices that are frequently completely divorced
from both world and domestic prices for identical items. The
trade volume is negotiated annually, at prices which apply to
longer (normally, five year) periods. Trade between the Soviet
Union and the participating socialist countries is conducted on the
basis of agreements calling for the balancing of trade payments of
each country vis-à-vis all other participating countries. These give
rise to balances on IBEC's books in an accounting unit called the
"transferable ruble," which is nothing more than a conventional
unit of account, inconvertible into any of the currencies of the
socialist countries, including the ruble. Neither are transferable
ruble balances convertible into commodities, since they originate
in the nondelivery of goods contracted for and no free market
exists in which such rubles can be spent outside the framework of
commodity trade agreed upon in advance.
Trade payments between participants are converted into trans-
ferable rubles on the basis of the official exchange rates between a
member's currency and the Soviet ruble. However, non-commer-
cial transactions (for example, those arising from tourism and
various services) are converted at negotiated rates, designed to
approximate more closely the purchasing power of the currencies
in the consumer goods markets of the various countries. Such
transactions are originally recorded in a separate set of accounts
carried in national currencies. At the end of each year, balances in
separate bilateral compensating accounts for service payments
are reduced by a conversion factor originally set at 3.4 in 1963 and
in 1971 reduced to 2.3 and added to balances arising from mer-





































'41n practice, a mi
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result in a given year from the failure of one or both parties to
achieve the volume of trade originally agreed upon can be offset
(or further aggravated) by service and other nontrade payments,
including those arising from joint investment projects. A debtor
country may receive credit from IBEC within stipulated limits (in
fact, automaticallyup to 6 percent of the total amount of the trade
volume), which can be repaid only by delivery of additional goods
acceptable to the other party. Such repayment may be reflected in
appropriate adjustments in the following year's trade agreement.
A limited volume of credit with fixed maturities of up to five years
(with interest rates ranging up to 5 percent) is also available.
In 1973, IBEC's tenth year of operation, clearings exceeded 47
billion rubles and mutual offsets between members were still its
main activity. Temporary imbalances between receipts and pay-
ments of individual countries required in 1973 extension of 3.8
billion of short-term credits in transferable rubles, or about 8
percent of the payments compensated (95 percent of which were
related to trade). These loans carry a nominal interest rate charge
which, since 1970, has ranged, depending on maturity, between 2
and 5 percent per annum, with the highest rate charged on loans
overdue.'4 Temporarily redundant funds in convertible currencies
deposited by IBEC members are invested mainly in Eurocurrency
markets (or are re-lent to members).
The balance sheet of IBEC is small compared with its opera-
tions. At the end of 1973, total assets of the institution, through
which trade and other payments of the socialist countries of
Europe are settled, were still less than 2.8 bfflion transferable
rubles (with loans extended accounting for nearly 60 percent of
the total, and funds held on deposits for most of the remainder),
not much more than the assets of the smallest among the Federal
Reserve Banks.
NONSOCIALIST COUNTRIES
Trade relations of the Soviet Union with nonsociaiist countries
have been expanding rapidly in recent years, particularly with the
multiple exchange rates covering non-trade transactions among socialist countries, see
Aizenberg {l].
'41n practice, a large part of credits extended is interest-free. Statutory charges ranged
originally for 1¼ percent for seasonal credits to 3 percent for amounts past due.
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highly industrialized Western countries. In the years immediately Advance pla
following World War II, such trade was conducted on the basis of balancingpayr
agreements providing for bilateral balancing, with all payments bles), takingi:
cleared through an account maintained at one of the central imports. Last r
banks. Trade with advanced countries, many of which have in deficits withco
recent years provided a considerable volume of export credits, ing Soviet long
has gradually become subject to a more flexible payments regime, technology.
generally involving payment in convertible currencies of balances While Soviet
in either direction at the end of the year, or else settlement of all to each counti
payments as they become due in a specified cOnvertible currency. observing the ti
In the sixties, "switch trai.ling" was developed for the purpose is conducted ii
of disposing, at a discount, excessive credit balances in bilateral invisible
accounts by triangular and other complex transactions. Such gold sales. Th
trading has shrunk considerably since the late sixties, but has re- (estimated at
bounded with the oil crisis.'5 These estimate
Foreign trade with most less developed nonsocialist countries several minor i
(currently about seventy) is still ruled by trade treaties that stipu- estimated on ti
late the volume and commodity composition of mutual trade, as tions, since th(
well as the mode of payment and other details of settlement. In ments statistics
recent years, there has been a growing tendency on the part of the One estimate
Soviet Union to replace such agreements with treaties stipulating convertible cu
merely the target levels of trade exchanges, with all balances to be reserves is give
settled in convertible currencies. Since data or
Typically, trade agreements cover several years and are supple- released by thi
mented with annual "protocols." The underlying negotiations are been
carried out on the Soviet side primarily by the Ministry of Foreign themselves, the
Trade, which also normally negotiates any extension of foreign as indicative of
credits that might be involved, close
Annual plans for international payments (foreign exchange bud- shown.
gets) are prepared by the Soviet Union for each country with Pnvate estim
which it trades. Such plans are aggregated by currency area, and differ considera
areS ultimately incorporated in overall plans for all convertible Central Inteffig
currenciesandthoseclearedthroughbilateralaccounts. 7.3, measured i
Obviously, planning of payments involving nonsocialist countries As can be se
must take into consideration possible price fluctuations and cydi- currency deficit
cal and other influences relevant to the ability of the Soviet Union match deficits y
to buy and sell in those markets. could be met
loans. Graduall
lSSee "Back to Barter," The Economist, Sec. 14—20, 1974. so that by 1965Foreign Trade and Payments 145
Advance planning of trade with each country generally aims at
balancing payments flows in each direction (allowing for invisi-
bles), taking into account any available sources for financing
imports. Last resort use of monetary gold is reserved for meeting
deficits with countries whose imports are essential for implement-
ing Soviet longer-term plans for enlarging capacity and upgrading
technology.
While Soviet planning involves advance decisions with regard
to each country, a meaningful overall picture is obtained by
observing the trade gap with all countries with which Soviet trade
is conducted in convertible or "hard" currencies, estimates of
invisible payments, and the two sources of financing—loans and
gold sales. The overwhelming bulk of trade in hard currency
(estimated at 90 percent in 1971) is with developed countries.
These estimates may involve significant percentage errors for
several minor items. All items other than merchandise trade are
estimated on the basis of various types of evidence and assump-
tions, since the Soviet Union does not publish balance of pay-
ments statistics (see Table 7.1).
One estimate of the share of gold sales in settling deficits with
convertible currency countries and the level of USSR gold
reserves is given in Table 7.2.
Since data on gold production, sales or monetary stock are not
released by the Soviet authorities, and private estimates have
been frequently revised in the past and do not agree among
themselves, the data in Table 7.2 should be considered essentially
as indicative of the order of magnitudes involved rather than as a
close approximation of year-to-year changes in the various series
shown.
Private estimates of Soviet gold production and its use, which
differ considerably from data widely used earlier and based on
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates, are given in Table
7.3, measured in metric tons.
As can be seen from Table 7.2, settlement of the convertible
currency deficit required gold sales, but estimated sales do not
match deficits year by year. In 1960, about one-third of the deficit
could be met from net receipts from medium- and long-term
loans. Gradually, repayments rose more rapidly than new loans,
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TABLE 7.2





Year Deficit (positive) Gold Sales Gold Reserves"
1960 250 200 2555
1961 161 300 2365
1962 233 215 2550
1963 275 550 1800
1964 483 450 1495
1965 186 550 1095
1966 238
b 1265
1967 95C 15 1425
1968 109 12 1590
1969 311 ' 1765
1970 514 b 1945
1971 303 2135
1972 1100 250—300 2400
SOURCE: [154], p. 702.
°Goldsales 1960—1968 and reserves (at year end) are calculated at the official
price of $35 per ounce and $38 for 1972.
Surplus.
Foreign Credit and Investments
The Soviet financial system does not permit financial investment
or even holding of balances in foreign exchange by foreigners
other than diplomats. International flows resulting from lending
not directly related to foreign trade and investing are insignificant.
Until the end of World War II, Soviet international credit flows,
like those of Tsarist Russia, were one-sided. The Soviet Union
was a borrower, mainly on short-term capital accounts.'6 It con-
tinues to finance a large part of its capital imports through
'°The Soviet government did not have to meet problems arising from foreign holdings of
Russian securities, since all such claims (whether denominated in rubles or in foreign
currencies) were repudiated after the revolution. No funded borrowing abroad (in contrast
to using bank and vendor credit) was ever attempted by the Soviet government.ble. As a result
and the
by the end of 1
nearly 40
end of 1972
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TABLE 7.3












1950 139 — 5 +123 1446













1954 145 67 7 + 74 1875
1955 146 67 8 + 70 1945
1956 147 133 10 +8 1953
1957 153 • 231 11 — 85 1863
1958 162 1% 12 — 42 1826
1959 173 222 14 — 61 1765
1960 181 178 15 —5 1760
1961 197 173 16 + 12 1772
1962 210 191 19 +5 1777
1963 222 489 20 —280 1497
1964 237 401 21 +178 1319
1965 254 488 23 —251 1068
1966 268 — 25 +253 1321
1967 283 13 28 +208 1529
1968 299 10 31 • +263 1792
1969 325 — 33 +285 2077
1970 347 — 37 +299 2376
1971 360 20 42 +283 2659
1972 379 190 57 +113 2772
1973 398 280 86 +5 2777
1975 Plan 441 .. .. .. ..
SOURCE: Michael Kaser, "Comecon,International Currency Review, May—June
1974, pp. 60—62. For output only, revised in 1975 (private communications from Mr.
Kaser). The revisions are small (not exceeding 10 tons) prior to 1965; they are higher for
1969 and the following year.
"barter-on-time" in which imported equipment is paid for in kind
by the additional output which it produces.
In fact, in some respects 1965 represents a turning point in the
financing pattern of the trade deficit in convertible currencies.
Following relatively large gold sales to help finance imports of
grain following poor harvests in 1963 and 1965, gold sales could be
reduced considerably as alternative credit sources became availa-Foreign Credit and Investments 149
ble. As a result, and following the more intensive working of old,
and the discovery of new, gold fields, the Soviet gold stock, which
by the end of 1965 had declined to little more than $1 billion (or by
nearly 40 percent in five years), is estimated to have risen by the
end of 1972 (measured in tons) rapidly. According to Kaser (Table
7.3) it was at a level considerably in excess of the end of 1960
volume. Since the mid 1960s, greater reliance on (and availability
of) foreign loans has rapidly raised the ratio of debt service to
convertible currency exports from 5 percent in 1960 to 18 percent
ten years later, and 19 percent in 1972, as medium- and long-term
debt in convertible currencies is estimated to have risen by the
end of 1972 to $3 billion. The Soviet Union, and its creditors,
might consider a 20—25 percent debt service ratio as an upper
limit.
Foreign credit available to the Soviet Union (apart from the
short-term credit normally extended for various raw materials and
nondurable goods) falls into three main categories: vendor credit,
bank credit, and official loans. These distinctions are less than
clearcut in the case of some of the main exporters of machinery
and equipment (such as France and Italy) where the principal.
commercial banks are nationalized, or where some export credits
are granted by government-owned corporations. In any case
practically all loans are issued by government-sponsored organi-
zations. In contrast to the other socialist countries, the Soviet
Union had not as yet attempted until late in 1974 to borrow long-
term in international capital markets, such as the Eurodollar
market, although Soviet-owned banks have participated in con-
sortia sponsoring such borrowing by banks of several of the
smaller socialist countries.
The Johnson Act precludes such borrowing from the U.S. since
the Soviet Union has refused to recognize official debts of Tsarist
Russia. This contrasts with the ease of almost all of the other
countries of Eastern Europe which have reached agreements with
the U.S. and other creditors to settle debts of their respective
governments made prior to the institution of Communist regimes.
Since the advent of the detente the Soviet Union has endea-
vored to obtain U.S. and other foreign financing for a variety of
large projects, involving mainly natural resources. Such arrange-
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repayment for foreign machinery, equipment, engineering ser- below) and pri
vice, and knowhow is to take place over long periods (stretching eral investmen•
out as long as the lifetime of a generation) through the delivery of Shares of th
products of these projects. Represented as "sell-liquidating cred- million transfe
its," these arrangements (few of which have been consummated convertible cui
as yet) arecongenialwith the Soviet emphasis on the real, as each in inter-C
contrasted with financial, aspects of economic processes, since operations the
they do not make the interest cost as explicit as in financial loans aggregat
borrowing. The acceptability of such projects to private entrepre- convertible cu
neurs depends not only on such political factors as assessment of tional Bank for
the status of such arrangements under a different Soviet leader- lished in 1973 a
ship, but also on the anticipated time profile of world market to less-develop
prices for the products to be received in• repayment over an was granted at
extended period and the nature of adjustment formulas and mech- some socialist c
anisms built into such contracts. It appears that the various the Soviet Uni
sources of finance for Soviet import surpluses from Western "loans"
countries discussed have been, or are about to be, exhausted projects.
before Soviet trade has expanded to a volume generally consid- The Soviet I.
ered desirable and feasible. This raises a number of broad ques- tary and finan
tions with regard to Soviet economic policy which are, indeed, the Bretton Wc
beyond the scope of this study. IBRD were es
Alter World War lithe Soviet Union began to grant credit to officials in rece
other socialist countries and to some underdeveloped countries, position,
normally in connection with the export of capital goods. In some particular, in th
exceptional cases it made hard currency loans to countries in ing disclosure
Eastern Europe confronted with pressing reconstruction needs or unwiffing to
with political difficulties. Export of capital to underdeveloped arrangements a
countriesisaccomplished largely through supplying goods to make signifi
(including complete factories) and services, partly on a grant-in- alternative regil
aid basis, partly against future deliveries in kind.'7 In fact, with pressure on the
very few exceptions, international borrowing and lending involves Neither has t
product payback schemes, which involve barter on time, the Settlements (B]
contracts merely being the recording of the monetary value of the COMECOI
goods deliveries related to negotiated investment projects. This goes back to th
applies also to investments in socialist countries through the case, the ownei
International Investment Bank (JIB) since its creation in 1971 (see the Baltic states
of gold held in t
'7For a detailed historical review of foreign lending to the USSR since 1917 and of credit bbut ha extended by the USSR to the developing areas and to other socialist countries, see e,
Komissarov and Popov [46], Ch. 18. membership.
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countries, see
below) and prior to that, to the bilateral and infrequent multilat-
eral investment projects.
Shares of the member countries in the Bank's capital of 1,052.6
million transferable rubles (in small part to be contributed in
convertible currencies) are related to the relative importance of
each in inter-COMECON trade. During the first three years of
operations the IIB made commitments to finance 33 projects with
loans aggregating 280 million rubles, about half of which was in
convertible currencies. Following the example of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the IIB estab-
lished in 1973 a special fund designated to extend long-term credit
to less-developed countries. The first IIB loan to the Soviet Union
was granted at the end of 1973, although in the preceding years
some socialist countries had participated in large-scale projects in
the Soviet Union by supplying equipment and thus establishing
"loans" repayable in goods to be produced by the individual
projects.
The Soviet Union has not joined any of the international mone-
tary and financial organizations although its delegates attended
the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 at which the IMF and the
IBRD were established. Despite various statements by Soviet
officials in recent years that the Soviet Union might reconsider its
position, acquiring membership in the two organizations and, in
particular, in the IMF, would involve reporting obligations requir-
ing disclosure of data which so far the Soviet Union has been
unwiffing to make public. The 1951 breakdown of the monetary
arrangements administered by the IMF and the subsequent failure
to make significant progress toward establishing a modified or
alternative regime have been additional factors in diminishing the
pressure on the Soviet Union to reconsider its original position.
Neither has the Soviet Union joined the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), of which all the other European members of
the COMECON are members, continuing an association which
goes back to the founding of the Bank in the early thirties. In this
case, the ownership of shares in the BIS which were acquired by
the Baltic states at the time of the Bank's founding, and the status
of gold held in their accounts, constitute legal hurdles which need
to be, but have not been, resolved to clear the way for
membership.
- a. .152 Banking and the Foreign Sector
The Bank for Foreign Trade
Although the Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank) was orga-
nized in 1922, until 1961 it operated virtually as adepartmentof
the State Bank.'8 Its responsibilities were limited to handling
foreign exchange operations of a non-commercial character, such
as dealings with foreign diplomatic missions, and foreign remit-
tances. All other foreign banking activities were normally carried
out by the State Bank.'9 In 1961 the Bank for Foreign Trade was
reorganized and given greatly expanded operating responsibilities
for the financing of Soviet foreign trade, while remaining subordi-
nated to the State Bank in all policy matters. In fact, the Bank for
Foreign Trade is now the point of contact of foreigners for all
financial transactions with the Soviet Union.
Foreign operations are conducted by the Bank for Foreign
Trade under the direction of the State Bank, which has been in
charge of administering the foreign exchange monopoly since
1922. At the beginning of 1964, all correspondent accounts of the
State Bank with foreign commercial banks were transferred to the
Bank for Foreign Trade, with the State Bank retaining only
accounts with foreign central banks. All dealings in the Soviet
Union with foreign tourists and other foreigners remain in the
hands of the State Bank, due to the very limited facilities of the
Bank for Foreign Trade, which operates branches only in Lenin-
grad (since 1968) and in the new Pacific port of Nachodka (since
1970).
The Bank for Foreign Trade now operates very much like the
'8For the of the Bank, see D.K., January 1963. See also Gekker [235].
"The State Bank maintains currency exchange facilities at border crossing points,
airports and railroad stations and in hotels in which foreign tourists are lodged (those
operated by "Inturist," the organization in charge of foreign tourism). The State Bank also
provides limited and strictly regulated facilities for nationals and foreigners who maintain
accounts in foreign currencies, which can be used abroad or converted into rubles. The
State Bank also provides foreign exchange to Soviet citizens travelling abroad.
The State Bank will automatically buy currency of, or checks on banks of, a non-
communist country (although those denominated in nonconvertible currencies are accepted
only "on consignment"), but it will not freely exchange bank notes of any socialist country.
As a rule, funds for travel in socialist countries are carried in travelers' checks denominated
in the currency of the country a Soviet tourist plans to visit.
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foreign department of any of the roughly 1,500foreigncommer-
cial banks in about one hundred countries with which it maintains
correspondent relationships. In order to facilitate business rela-
tions with foreign commercial banks, the Bank for Foreign Trade
is organized along the lines of a European joint stock bank; the
State Bank holds the bulk of its shares while the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and some other official organizations hold the
remainder. 20
The Bank's domestic activities include paying (in rubles)
domestic foreign trade organizations the proceeds of exports and
any service and other foreign payments due them. It extends
credit to various state enterprises in charge of foreign trade. In
effect, however, in providing short-term ruble credits, it merely
acts as an agent of the State Bank. Table 7.4 presents its balance
sheet for the end of 1973.
The Bank for Foreign Trade's activities in connection with
export and import financing are conducted in close cooperation
with several Soviet-owned banks abroad. In addition to the usual
activities of banks specializing in foreign trade (such as collec-
tions), these banks raise funds for bridging temporary gaps in the
availability of convertible currencies, transfer, and convert funds,
take foreign exchange positions, and invest temporarily redun-
dant foreign exchange. They maintain wide networks of corre-
spondent banks to service their own needs as well as those of the
Bank for Foreign Trade and the State Bank, and of official banks
of other socialist countries using their services.
Soviet-owned banks abroad give the Soviet Union (and other
socialist countries) a point of contact with the money markets of
the West for dealing in gold and convertible currencies and for
participation in the Eurodollar market. Indeed, these banks were
major participants in the Eurodollar market at its inception. Two
201n contrast to the State Bank, the Bank for Foreign Trade operates in a competitive
environment and its operations abroad must conform to foreign usage Its operations must
adjust continuously to fluctuations in foreign exchange markets, and numerous other
changes in conditions over which it has no control. In contrast to the personnel of the State
Bank, the staff of the Bank for Foreign Trade must continuously assess markets and trends
and make quick decisions to take advantage of opportunities as well as to protect the
Bank's interests and to avoid losses. The senior personnel of the Bank for Foreign Trade is.
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TABLE 7 4 London after t.
cies in 1958m Balance Sheet of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR as of operations
January 1, 1974 conducts a vat
(in millions of rubles) to acquire and
Assets Liabilities commitment t(
Cash and bank deposits 2,070 Deposits 8,289 specializes in
Investments 15 Borrowing, guarantees and financial intert
Loans and discounts 11,172 acceptances 4,278 with the othei
Other assets 2 Capital 594
Profits and reserves 94 facilitates the
Other liabilities 4 countries) wit!
Total 13,260 Total 13,260 channel for th
of the Soviet I
SOURCE: D.K., August 1974.
NOTE: Loans are gross and include acceptances and guarantees offset by a counter-
entry under liabilities. The various foreign assets and liabilities are presumably converted
into rubles at official exchange rates.
of these banks occupy an important position in the cities where
they are located: the Moscow Narodny Bank in London and the
Banque Commerciale pour 1'Europe du Nord in Paris.2' The
Moscow Narodny Bank was originally established in London
before World War I as an agency of a Russian Bank for Coopera-
tives. The Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord was
bought by Soviet interests in 1925 from Russian anti-communist
emigres who organized it. The shares of both banks are owned
entirely by various official entities of the Soviet Union. They have
been able to attract a large volume of deposits from a variety of
sources, including firms doing business with the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries, and correspondent banks of the official
banks of these countries. Both banks are very active in all kinds
of transactions related to the foreign trade of the socialist coun-
tries of Europe, as well as of Cuba and China.
While the activities of the Paris bank began to expand rapidly in
the early fifties, the growth of the Moscow Narodny Bank in
21Other Soviet-owned banks abroad are the Voskhod Bank, organized in 1966, in
Zurich, the Ost-West Handeisbank formed in 1972 in Frankfurt, and the Russo-Iranian Bank
in Teheran, carried over from the pre-revolutionary days. The Moscow Narodny Bank,
which, in the twenties, had branches in New York, Paris, and Berlin, opened a branch in
Beirut in 1963. Between the two World Wars, additional foreign banks owned by official 22See Gekker (23 Soviet interests operated in several other countries of Europe and Asia.
I---The Bank for Foreign Trade 155
London after the advent of convertibility of most Western curren-
cies in 1958 may be termed extraordinary. In addition to credit
the USSR operations related one way or another to East-West trade, it
conducts a variety of other operations, including some designed
to acquire and maintain the image of a British bank, with the usual
commitment to discount operations. By contrast, the Paris bank
8,289 specializes in foreign exchange operations and various types of
s and financial intermediation.22 The Moscow Narodny Bank, together
4,278 withthe other officially owned Soviet banks abroad, not only
94 facilitates the trade of the Soviet Union (and the other socialist
4 countries) with the nonsocialist countries, but also serves as the
channelfor the sale of gold and for managing the foreign reserves
of the Soviet Union.
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